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The opinion does not disclose any evidence to the effect that
defendant was attempting to make a lawful arrest or that deceased knew of such a purpose, other than the single instance of
defendant's signaling to the other constable. Had such evidence
been introduced the case would then be on all fours with State v.
Stockton, 97 W. Va. 46, 124 S. E. 509, which held that there was
no evidence of malice when the accused, making a lawful arrest,
shot his prisoner in what he honestly believed to be self defense.
In the next issue it will be submitted that second degree murder
would not apply to this case.
-JUIAN

SURvivA.

OF ACTION

-

G. HEARNE, JR.

LIABILITY INSURANCE

-

DIRECT RIGHT

AGAINST THE INSURER.-Plaintiff was injured in a collision between a car in which he was riding, and the car of an individual
taxi operator, who had complied with Section 62, Chapter 6, Acts
of 1923, by filing with the State Road Commission satisfactory
liability insurance for the purpose of indemnifying the public for
injuries to person and property resulting from such collisions.
The defendant insurance company was his insurer. The taxi
operator having died before the plaintiff brought her action, the
only available party against whom suit could be brought was
defendant company. The plaintiff sued about nine months after
the cause of action arose. Held, the plaintiff could not proceed
against the insurer alone until such claim was liquidated. The
court followed principles enunciated in O'Neal v. Transportation
Company, 99 W. Va. 456, 129 S. E. 478, without any discussion.
Criss v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 142 S. E.
849 (W. Va. 1928).
By this holding the court cut the plaintiff off from any satisfaction whatever. The hardship is due in part to the rule that
an action for injuries does not survive against the estate of a
deceased tort-feasor. This obviously objectionable common law
rule has been remedied by statute in a large number of jurisdictions. See 1 C. J. 196. The WEST VIRGINIA 'CODE, Chapter
127, Section 2, provided that "If the plaintiff or defendant die
pending any action, whether the cause of action would survive
at common law or not, the same may be revived and prosecuted
to judgment and execution in the same manner as if it were for
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a cause of action arising out of contract." But the court has
construed this statute to be merely procedural and the action
does not survive even where the defendant dies after the action
has been begun. Woodford v. McDaniels, 73 W. Va. 736, 81 S.
E. 544.
The hardship of this rule, however, might have been obviated
in the principal case if the plaintiff had been given a direct right
against the insurer. The generally accepted rule is that a judgment against the insured is a condition precedent to an action
against the insurer. United States Fidelity Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, 182 II. App. 438; Burke v. London
Guarantee Company, 93 N. Y. S. 652; Bowers v. Gates, 201
MVich. 146, 166 N. W. 880; 36 C. J. 1129. The only question is whether the statute changes the rule in this particular
type of case. This statute, cited above, reads as follows: "No
certificate (license to operate an automobile for hire) shall be
issued by the State Road Commission to any applicant until
after such applicant shall have filed with the State Road Commission a bond with surety approved by the commission, or liability insurance satisfactory to the commission, and in such sum
as the Commission may deem necessary to adequately protect the
interest of the public with due regard to the number of persons
and the amount of property involved, which bond shall bind the
obligors thereunder to make compensation for the injury to persons, and loss of, or damage to property, resulting from the operation of such motor vehicles".
It will be observed that the statute allows the applicant to file
either a bond with surety, or liability insurance. In the O'Neal
Case, supra, which is followed by the principal case, the court
makes a distinction between a bond and a liability insurance policy, admitting that the surety and principal may be joined when
suing on the bond, but denies such an action where insurance is
filed. The distinction is based on the fact that a bond and an
insurance policy are different types of obligations with different
incidents. The law is apparently settled in this jurisdiction in
accord with the principal case. But in other jurisdictions, either
by express statutory provision or by a broad construction of similar statutes, a contrary conclusion has been reached, and an action
directly against the insurer allowed. Devoto v. Transportation
Company, 128 Wash. 604, 223 Pac. 1050; Millivon v. Dittman,
180 Cal. 443, 181 Pac. 779; White v. Kane, 179 Wis. 478, 192 N.
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W. 57; Boyle v. Manufacturers Liability Insurance Company, 96
N. J. L. 380, 115 Atl. 383.
It was urged by the plaintiff's counsel in the instant case that
the situation was anomalous, the plaintiff having a right but no
remedy. The court's reply was that the plaintiff waited too long
to sue. This, of course, is not a satisfactory answer in view of
the fact that the statute of limitations on tort actions gives the
plaintiff a year. BARNES' 'CODE, chapter 104, section 12. Even if
the action had been begun in the lifetime of the insured, under
the Woodford :ase, supra, there would be no remedy unless judgment had been given prior to his death. The injured party is
thus confronted on the one hand with this rule that his action
does not survive the defendant's death, and on the other hand
with the rule in the 0 Neal Case, supra.
This case emphasizes the need for an amendment to Section 62
of Chapter 6, Acts of 1923, providing expressly for a direct right
against the insurer. This is especially desirable as long as West
Virginia has no statute providing for the survival of tort actions
against the estates of deceased tort-feasors.
-JAmES E. Hoauri, JR.

INTERSTATE

OOMERCE--STATE

PROHIBITIONS

OF

EXPORT

OF

REsoURCES-SHRImP.The petitioners, shrimp packers, of Mississippi, sue to have the State of Louisiana enjoined from enforcing
a statute which prohibits the selling of shrimp in other states before the shells and heads are removed. The statute is formally
aimed to secure for the state the benefit of the heads and shells
for fertilizer. Petitioner claims that this is a feigned motive and
that the real purpose is to prevent the Mississippi packers from
buying shrimp taken in Louisiana waters and so give this industry to Louisiana. It is shown that only a very small part of
the shrimp taken are consumed in Louisiana and that, instead
of being used for fertilizer, the heads and hulls are a nuisance to
packers, being worth less than one per centum of the value of the
edible meat. The statute does not prohibit the sale of shrimp out
of the state, but fixes the amount of preparation which they
must have before such sale. The injunction is granted on the
ground that this statute is in violation of the interstate com-
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